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Over the last twenty years, transaction-cost economics and agency theory have been used
to analyze organization and contracting practices in a wide range of industries.  Despite
significant progress overall in our understanding of organization and contracting practices,
however, some industries and practices have resisted such analysis.  One such industry is freight
hauling.  Although a number of authors have analyzed the governance of freight transactions in
transaction cost (e,g, Palay, 1984; Pirrong, 1993; Nickerson and Silverman, 1999; and Hubbard,
2001) or agency (Baker and Hubbard, 2000, 2001) terms, neither relationship-specific
investments nor incentive alignment — traditionally the focal concerns of these two approaches
— provide fully satisfactory explanations for the range of organizational arrangements observed
in the industry.  Recent efforts to expand the concept of asset specificity to accommodate the use
of long-term contracts and vertical integration in freight hauling notwithstanding, the
quintessential redeployability of assets used to transport freight, and the short-term, repeat nature
of freight transactions, make it hard to believe that protection of relationship-specific
investments against appropriation is a dominant concern of freight transactors.  Agency theory,
meanwhile, seems unable to account for observed variations in some of the industry’s most
salient organizational features.  Differences in driver compensation arrangements, for example,
appear to bear little or no relation to the incentive functions traditionally ascribed to
compensation schemes in the agency literature: Regardless of the basis on which trucker
compensation is determined, the fees truckers ultimately receive for any given haul are (almost
always) fixed ex ante and, thus, are unaffected by—and therefore cannot affect—the level of
effort the trucker expends carrying out the haul in question.3
Without denying the importance of these frameworks in general, we emphasize an
alternative motivation for contracting that better relates observed patterns in the governance of
freight hauling transactions with the fundamental features of the industry.  Specifically, we argue
that the central substantive problem in freight transportation generally, and trucking in particular,
is the logistical one of assigning heterogeneous drivers and trucks to hauls and that,
corresponding to this, a central organizational problem is that of determining the fees that
carriers pay drivers for each haul.  Our argument is most closely related to the analysis of price
determination mechanisms in the transaction cost literature
1 and, more recently, to Oyer’s (2000)
analysis of managerial compensation, which emphasizes the role of the participation constraint,
as opposed to marginal incentives, in agency relationships.
The paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, we explain in more detail why we
believe asset specificity and marginal incentive concerns, which dominate the existing literature
on contracting and organization, do not provide good explanations for the observed variation in
governance arrangements in trucking.  In section 3, we provide an overview of the trucking
industry and describe the coordination and pricing problems inherent therein.  In section 4, we
develop a more formal model and derive from it a set of testable hypotheses.  We describe our
data in section 5, followed, in section 6, by our empirical analyses and results.  Consistent with
the predictions of our model, we find that arrangements for determining driver compensation are
related to the heterogeneity of haul attributes: (i) hauls carried by flatbed, refrigerated, and tanker
trucks exhibit greater variance in attributes affecting drivers’ costs than do hauls carried in
standard dry vans, and (ii) drivers of flatbed, refrigerated, and tanker vehicles are more likely,
relative to dry van drivers, to be paid a percentage of the carrier’s revenue than on the basis of
                                                   
1See Goldberg (1985); Goldberg and Erickson (1987); Williamson (1985); Klein (1992; 1996); Masten (1988); and
Crocker and Masten (1991).4
mileage.  In addition, unlike some previous studies of organization in the trucking industry, we
find no significant difference in vehicle ownership associated with the types of trailers drivers
pull, suggesting that differences in asset characteristics are not an important determinant of asset
ownership in this industry.  Driver ownership of trucks does, however, appear to be a function of
driver wealth and experience, which is consistent with findings in the literature on self-
employment.
2  We discuss implications of our results for the study of organization and
contracting issues more generally in the final section.
2. Specific Investments and Incentives in Trucking and Transportation.
Relationship-specific investments.  The use of long-term contracts and vertical
integration to govern transportation services represents a puzzle to transaction cost economists
because the assets involved in transportation typically exhibit none of the four main types of
asset specificity identified in the transaction cost literature: physical, site, or human asset
specificity and dedicated assets (see Williamson, 1985).  The primary physical assets used for
hauling freight — ships, barges, trains, trucks, and aircraft — are obviously mobile and are
typically general purpose in function.  A standard railroad boxcar or a truck trailer, for example,
is little more than a covered platform on wheels capable of carrying a wide range of cargo.  Each
boxcar or trailer, moreover, is essentially interchangeable and can be hitched to and pulled by
most any locomotive engine or truck tractor.  By the same token, the navigation and cargo-
handling skills and knowledge required to operate such equipment, however specialized, are
rarely specific to a shipper or carrier.
                                                   
2 See, for instance, Dunn and Holtz-Eakin (2000), Evans and Leighton (1989), and Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and
Rosen (1994).5
To be sure, not all transportation assets are perfectly fungible.  Some assets, such as rail
lines and loading equipment, may be specific to a particular shipper (see Pittman, 1992; and
Saussier, 2000).  In addition, vehicles may, on occasion, be designed to carry specific loads for
particular shippers, as were automobile carriers and some chemical tank cars in Palay’s (1984)
study of rail transport.   Consistent with the relationship-specific investment hypothesis, the
evidence from these studies shows that such assets are more likely to be owned by the shipper or
the transaction protected by long-term contract.  Nevertheless, the great bulk of freight-hauling
assets, even those specially designed to carry a particular type of cargo, such as cars or
chemicals, are rarely specific to a particular shipper or carrier.  Yet the governance of
transactions supported by these assets varies considerably.
Attempting to resolve this puzzle, several researchers have recently suggested that
governance differences in freight transactions might be the result of transitory quasi-rents arising
from the temporary lack of substitute trading partners or from “temporal specificity,” a condition
that occurs when the timing of delivery is so important that the threat of delay becomes a tactic
for extracting rents (see, generally, Masten et al. 1991).  As Hubbard describes it (2001:372):
Once a truck arrives at a haul’s origin to be loaded, it is costly for the carrier to use that truck to
serve another shipper.  It must identify an alternative customer and incur time and transportation
costs to receive the load.  Moreover, it may be costly for the shipper to be served by another
carrier, also because of search and time costs.
According to this argument, the size and duration of these transitory quasi-rents will tend
to vary over time and with the location and characteristics of cargo:  In general, specialized cargo
carriers (i.e., vehicles designed to carry a particular cargo but not specific to a particular shipper)
will generate larger transitory rents than general-purpose vehicles (Pirrong, 1993).  In trucking,
refrigerated trailers, specialized car-hauling trailers, and chemical tankers would tend to be less
readily available on short notice than general-purpose vans (Fernandez et al., undated).6
Similarly, transitory rents might also result from differences in optimal tractor configurations for
pulling different types of hauls (Nickerson and Silverman, 1999: 16):
The fuel efficiency of a tractor is highly dependent on the match between characteristics of the
haul (e.g., city vs. highway driving; long hauls vs. short hauls; heavy freight vs. light freight) and
the tractor’s drive-train configuration. . . .[A] truck not optimally configured for a haul could
experience fuel efficiency of fewer than 4 miles per gallon, as compared to 7-10 miles per gallon
for an optimal configuration  —  a severe penalty, given that fuel costs comprise more than one-
fourth of total trucking operating costs.
Following this argument, tractors with “mid-range” configurations, which have “the
widest operating range with the least cost penalty for minor variations in haul characteristics,”
will tend to be most common and generate the fewest quasi-rents, while tractors with
configurations designed for atypical loads will have fewer uses and less availability and, thus, be
more subject to hold up (Nickerson and Silverman, 1999: 16).
Finally, as industry experts have observed, the cost of a delay of a given duration, and
thereby the potential for opportunistic behavior, may also vary among transactions depending on
the time sensitivity, or temporal specificity, of the cargo:
We knew more about trucks and tight schedules than any company in the country.  So we looked
over the market and decided to put a little squeeze on here and there. . . .For example, milk spoils
pretty fast and so does bread and vegetables.  In no time at all, we had a lock on three of four of
the biggest fresh-food businesses in America. . . .After all, nothin’ spoils faster’n fish.
3
Although such transitory appropriation hazards have the potential to explain some of the
observed governance arrangements in freight transportation, it seems to us highly unlikely that
relationship-specific investments can account for variations in contracting and organizational
arrangements in the vast majority of trucking transactions for two reasons.  First, compared to
the amounts at stake in other settings where specific investments are normally thought to be a
problem, the size of appropriable quasi-rents in trucking transactions is minuscule.  Investments
                                                   
3"Management expert" (and mobster) Lucky Luciano, as quoted in Gosch and Hammer, 1974.7
in special tooling in automotive production, for example, often run into the millions of dollars,
while appropriable quasi-rents associated with site specificity in transactions between coal mines
and mine-mouth power plants (as in Joskow, 1987) can easily run to tens of millions of dollars
per year and hundreds of millions over the life of a plant.
In trucking, by comparison, the total cost of a shipment is typically only a few hundred
dollars.  On a typical haul between, say, Atlanta and Chicago (736 miles), a company driver
could expect to earn about $220 (at $.30 per mile; Goodson, 1999b), and an owner-operator
about $600 ($.82 per mile; Heine, 1999).  Even if an owner-operator could find no alternative
haul, the most that a carrier could hope to appropriate on this hypothetical haul, after taking into
account distance-related operating costs, would be about $400, or less than 1% of owner-
operators’ average annual net income (Owner-Operator Independent Driver Association, 2000).
By the same token, the amount that a driver could hope to appropriate from a carrier — and
hence the effort and expense that a driver would be willing to incur trying to effect such a hold
up — is limited to the cost and inconvenience a carrier would have to incur to induce another
driver to take the haul on short notice.  Even if the carrier had to double the going rate to assure
on-time delivery, no more than a few hundred dollars would be at stake.  In the more likely (but
still uncommon) scenario that the carrier would be forced to employ a tractor with a suboptimal
drive train to haul the load, the cost penalty, by Nickerson and Silverman’s figures, would be less
than 20%, or under $60 on our hypothetical Atlanta-Chicago haul.
Second, and perhaps more important, is the relatively short-term, repeat nature of
trucking transactions.  Whereas a typical model cycle in automotive production is three years and
electric power generators may operate for thirty years or more, the appropriable quasi-rents in
trucking are highly transitory, lasting only the time it takes — hours or, at most, days — to find8
and redeploy a suitable vehicle.  The punishment for holding up a trading partner in trucking, if
not instantaneous, is thus likely to be prompt.  No doubt, significant hold-up opportunities may
occur in cases of extreme and unanticipated delay costs and truck or driver scarcity.  In the vast
majority of transactions, however, the high speed and low cost of punishment (including
termination), combined with the small gains to hold up, seem likely to deter most egregious
manifestations of opportunism, making differences in hold-up opportunities among freight
transactions an unlikely determinant of observed organizational structures in everyday trucking
activities.
Moral hazard.  If asset specificity does not explain trucking governance, might agency
theory do better?  On the surface, truck transactions do appear to fit the standard agency model.
The effort expended by over-the-road truck drivers is clearly costly to monitor directly; by its
very nature, the work of these “last cowboys” (LeDuff, 2001) takes drivers large distances at all
times of day, making it difficult for shippers or carriers to assess not only their driving behavior
— speed, accident prevention, treatment of the truck, and so forth — but also other decisions
such as choice of route, timing and length of breaks, and care expended in minimizing cargo
damage or loss.
4   At the same time, truck drivers, whether employees or owner operators, might
reasonably be presumed to be more risk averse than shippers or carriers, for whom any given
shipment is likely to be a small item in a large portfolio.  Trucking transactions thus appear to
pose the standard risk-incentive tradeoff of agency theory, and one might therefore expect asset
ownership and compensation/sharing rules between truck drivers and carriers to vary with the
relative importance of risk and moral hazard across transactions.
5
                                                   
4 Baker and Hubbard (2000) note that the introduction of on-board computers and GPS tracking systems may be
reducing the cost of monitoring at least some aspects of drivers’ behavior.
5 Hidden information and selection issues, which have also been a concern of agency theorists, are unlikely to be a
major concern in light of the high frequency of transactions in trucking.9
The fact that truck ownership and driver compensation co-vary systematically would
appear, on first impression, consistent with agency considerations.  As table 1 shows, over-the-
road company drivers (employees who drive carrier-owned trucks) are typically compensated on
the basis of mileage whereas owner-operators (independent contractors who own their own
vehicles) are more likely to be paid a proportion of the revenues (freight bill) received by the
carrier for the haul.
6  Such a correlation might be expected, for example, if both vehicle
ownership and driver compensation methods are responses to the same underlying incentive
needs of the transaction.
TABLE 1: PAYMENT METHODS: COMPANY DRIVERS AND OWNER OPERATORS







Per mile 87.9 35.5 33.9
% of freight bill 5.2 54.4 46.3
Per trip 0.9 5.4 18.4
Hourly 7.2 4.4 na
*Upper Great Plains Transportation Institute (Griffen and Rodriguez, 1992).
**Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association (2000).
An agency interpretation of this variation confronts two problems, however.  The first is
the general problem of relating variations in ownership and surplus-sharing arrangements to
differences in relative risk preferences or in the marginal productivity of transactors across
transactions.  While risk or incentive considerations may provide plausible rationalizations for a
particular ownership or sharing arrangement, explaining variation in those arrangements requires
                                                   
6 Engel (1998) estimates that there are about 300,000 owner operators in the U.S. trucking industry, mostly in the
over-the-road (long distance) sector.  The vast majority of owner operators (75-80%) operate under “permanent
leases” under which they agree exclusively to carry a specific carrier’s hauls for an extended, often indeterminate,
period.  For additional information on the terms of these agreements, see Lafontaine (2000).10
identification of differences in the parties’ relative risk preferences or the relative productivity of
their (off-equilibrium) efforts (see, for instance, Whinston, 2000).
The second problem, more specific to trucking, concerns the fact that driver incentives
under the two main compensation methods — mileage- and revenue-based pay — are identical:
Under both schemes, driver compensation is determined ex ante and is unaffected by driver
behavior at the margin.  In the case of revenue-based pay, a driver (whether an employee or
owner operator) receives a pre-agreed percentage of the freight bill, the amount charged to the
shipper for the haul; since both the percent and the freight bill are known at the time a driver
takes the load, the driver knows exactly how much money a particular load will yield.  The same
is true of mileage-based pay, however.  Because the amount a driver receives is set according to
“bureau miles” rather than actual miles driven, the compensation of drivers paid on a mileage
basis is independent of route selection or other decisions that a driver makes during the haul.
7
With their compensation fixed ex ante, drivers effectively become residual claimants on each
haul, leaving them with high-powered incentives to select the best possible route given road
conditions, to avoid accidents and other sources of delays, and otherwise to undertake any
activity that lowers the cost of current loads or advances the acquisition of future ones.  But
whether mileage or revenue is the basis for setting driver compensation, the incentives to expend
effort on such activities are exactly the same.
8
                                                   
7 Major sources for these standardized distances include Rand McNally’s Household Good Miles, and PC*Miler
from ALK Associates.
8The incentive properties of mileage- and revenue-based compensation also apply for less frequently used per-load
lump sums but not for drivers paid an hourly wage.  Consistent with the difficulty of monitoring driver activities on
long hauls, hourly pay is rarely used for over-the-road drivers.11
3.  The Assignment and Pricing of Hauls.
To understand organizational arrangements in trucking, we need first to understand the
trucking industry and the problems that transactors in the industry need to solve.  We argue here
that the central substantive problem in freight hauling is logistical — the coordination of a large
number of small, heterogeneous transactions — and that the central organizational problem,
rather than protecting specific investments or aligning marginal incentives, is one of price
determination for driver services.
Viewed in the aggregate, the scheduling of transportation services so that the right
commodities arrive at the right location at the right time and at the lowest possible cost is a
coordination problem of enormous proportions.  Each year, truckers carry millions of hauls over
millions of miles for millions of customers between thousands of locations.
9   Even under the
assumption that all cargos and suppliers of transportation services are interchangeable,
determining the optimal route structure and assignment of hauls constitutes a classic logistical
problem requiring considerable time and expertise to solve.  In actuality, however, hauls vary
significantly in size, weight, distance, route, back-haul potential, and the extent to which they
require special care (because of fragility or perishability, for example) or special equipment
(such as car carriers, refrigerated trailers, or oversize or flat bed trailers).  Moreover, the efficient
assignment of hauls often depends on characteristics of consumers and suppliers of freight
services as well as of cargos and routes.  On the demand side, shippers and receivers differ with
respect to, among other things, the premium they place on speed or on-time performance relative
to price, their reliability in meeting schedules, the predictability of their shipments and flexibility
                                                   
9 It is estimated that 7.7 billion tons of freight were transported by truck in the United States during 1997 (U.S.
Department of Commerce, 1999).  An average payload of about 15 tons would thus imply something on the order of
500 million hauls per year.12
in accommodating pickups and deliveries, and their staffing of, and congestion at, loading docks.
On the supply side, drivers, who, in the first instance, bear the costs of hauling freight, differ in
their preferences over such things as routes, night driving and haul lengths as well as in their
ability and dependability.  Last but not least, the matching of hauls, clients, and drivers must be
performed and continually revised in light of ever-changing weather, traffic, equipment and road
conditions.
In the U.S., solving this coordination problem is the principal activity of the more than
ninety-thousand firms that make up the for-hire trucking industry (U.S Department of
Commerce, 2000).  These companies, or carriers, function essentially as brokers or middlemen,
identifying and selling transportation services to shippers and hiring drivers or owner-operators
to perform those services.
10  Unlike at least some other middlemen, however, carriers buy and
sell services whose characteristics are neither determinate nor fully under their control.  The
quality of the service that shippers receive depends in large measure on the actions and decisions
of drivers, while the cost to drivers of carrying a particular haul often depends on the cooperation
of shippers and receivers.
11  Given the highly competitive nature of freight hauling, a carrier’s
survival will depend heavily on its ability, first, to recruit dependable drivers and, then, to keep
“drivers and operators happy” by assigning them profitable hauls.
12
                                                   
10 In addition to freight carried by for-hire trucking companies, a substantial amount of freight is also carried by
private, “in-house” truck fleets of non-trucking firms.  Private fleets accounted for approximately $200 billion worth
of transportation services in 1997, or about 58% of the $347 billion total spent on motor carriage in that year
(Standard and Poor’s, 1998).  Although the operation of private fleets involves some of the logistical problems
described here, the problem of identifying and coordinating shippers is obviously not relevant to in-house
transportation.  Partly for this and partly for data reasons, our analysis focuses on for-hire firms and drivers.
11Robert Rothstein, general counsel for the Truckload Carriers Association, observes, “Some of these guys love their
own employers but can’t stand the customers they deliver to” (Wall Street Journal, 2001).
12Goodson, 2000: 12.  Estimates place the cost of recruiting and training a new driver, including advertising and a
typical two-to-three day orientation, “at close to $2,000” (Goodson, 1999a: 8).  The economic cost of driver turnover
would also include foregone earnings of drivers between jobs.13
In principle, it would seem that carriers could make drivers happy to carry any haul
simply by paying drivers an amount commensurate with the cost of the haul:  Hauls that require
additional time loading or waiting for delinquent customers or that are otherwise unattractive to
drivers should command a premium over more "driver friendly" hauls.
13  With such a large
number of heterogeneous hauls, however, discovering and settling on an acceptable level of
driver compensation for each haul would add yet another dimension to the carrier’s already
complex logistical problem.  And indeed, carriers consider such haul-by-haul pricing
impractical: "The feeling in dispatch is that having different pay rates becomes a nightmare of
trying to sell loads to drivers" (Goodson, 1999b: 1).  To avoid the hassle of negotiating
individual rates with each driver for each haul, standard industry practice is, as we saw in table 1,
for each carrier to pay its drivers for all loads according to a single pricing rule, typically either
per mile or in proportion to the freight bill.
14
A drawback to the use of such pricing rules is that the resulting prices may not accurately
reflect the actual costs of a particular haul, making some hauls more attractive than others.  Table
2 identifies a variety of haul attributes commonly regarded as “driver unfriendly” (Goodson,
2000).  As the list reveals, most of the attributes that drivers consider unattractive relate to time
spent on non-driving activities: Hand loading and unloading, freight sorting and segregating,
numerous stops, city driving, and customer inflexibility or failure to honor schedules all keep the
driver off the road and add to the time it takes to complete a haul.
15  Haul length can also affect
                                                   
13 This issue is hardly unique to freight transactions: Consider, for instance, the allocation and pricing of faculty
course and committee work.  On the problems of governing academic transactions, see Masten (2000).
14 Mileage and percentage rates are generally higher for owner operators than for company drivers, but all company
drivers or owner operators of a given carrier typically receive the same rate.
15 Certain cities in particular, such as New York, are known to involve longer waits for unloading and for reloading
of backhauls and are avoided by truckers (Goodson, 2000).  Overall, it is estimated that truck drivers spend an
average of about 25% of their time on non-driving work (Belman et al., 1998).14
TABLE 2.  “DRIVER-UNFRIENDLY” LOAD CHARACTERISTICS
Loading/unloading
conditions:
Hand loading or unloading
Sorting and segregating on dock
Scheduling: Appointment schedules not honored by customer (driver on time must wait)
Lack of flexibility in appointment schedules  (late driver must wait 24 hours)
Haul lengths: Short hauls (less than 400 miles)
Low productivity hauls (between 600 - 800 miles)




Source: National Survey of Driver Wages (Goodson, 2000)
the proportion of a driver’s time spent on the road and, thus, the “productivity” of the haul.  As a
rule, over-the-road drivers prefer a single long haul to a series of shorter hauls of equal mileage
because they can cover more territory in less time: On an 1800 mile haul, a driver is likely to be
able to average 60 miles per hour, whereas average speed on a haul of 300 miles falls to only 33
miles per hour (Sign Post Solutions, 2000).  But there are also exceptions to this rule.  Because
U.S. hours-of-service rules require an 8-hour rest for every 10 hours of driving, hauls of around
400 miles tend to leave a driver too little time to obtain and complete a second haul the same
day, limiting the driver’s earnings relative to what he could have earned on the 500-to-600 miles
coverable in a full day of driving.  Similarly, hauls of 600 to 800 miles tend to be unattractive
because they are too long to complete in a single day but not long enough to occupy two full
days, while weekend hauls of 800 miles are likely to keep the driver away from home for the
whole weekend yet are not long enough to keep the driver busy the whole time either.
16  At some
cost, the parties can, and do, attempt to incorporate additional observable cost determinants in
                                                   
16 Loads that would normally be considered unattractive may become attractive under certain conditions or to some
drivers.  A short haul that would be unattractive in the middle of the week, for instance, might be valued by a driver
looking to fill out his schedule at the end of a week, and a “500-mile load tendered on Monday through Thursday is
high utilization [whereas on] Friday, it can represent poor weekend utilization” (Goodson, 2000: 12).15
their agreements (see Lafontaine, 2000).  As long as pricing formulae do not fully capture all
such factors, however, drivers will prefer some hauls to others and reject, or at least resist,
unattractive haul assignments.
Because of the failure of the “pricing mechanism to compensate drivers for undesirable
loads, dispatchers have to go to great lengths to find drivers to get these loads moved” (Goodson,
1999b: 1, 12).  One such length is to promise drivers that take unattractive hauls “better-than-
usual” hauls later on: “It is common practice for dispatchers to promise to take care of drivers
who haul the undesirable loads.…[T]his constant swap of favors is how a lot of difficult hauls
get moved” (Goodson, 1999b: 12).  By allocating hauls in this way, carriers are able to balance
out profitable and unprofitable hauls, leaving drivers as well off on average as they would have
been had each haul been priced individually.  At the same time, however, the discretionary
assignment of hauls introduces other frictions as drivers find it difficult to distinguish valid quid-
pro-quos from opportunism: “Because it is not done in full view, other drivers cannot see the
difference between repaying a favor and favoritism to a particular driver” (id.).  Drivers that
perceive that their haul assignments contain too many undesirable, low-paying loads are likely to
quit, generating turnover costs for both themselves and the carrier.
17  In the end, the choice of
methods for pricing driver services must balance the tensions inherent in getting drivers to accept
unprofitable hauls at a fixed rate against the cost of negotiating prices for individual hauls.  “At
some point the question has to be asked, is the effort involved in getting company drivers to haul
loads at the same rate less than the effort required of offering different rates of pay for loads?”
(Goodson, 2000).
                                                   
17 To eliminate the perception of dispatcher favoritism and the problems it causes, some companies have tried
instituting policies, such as priority (e.g., first-available haul) allocation systems, that limit dispatcher discretion in
the assignment of hauls among drivers.  Carriers also try to keep their load composition secret to impede drivers
from drawing equity inferences from comparison of their hauls with the aggregate (Goodson, 1999b).16
4. The Pricing of Driver Services: A Model
In this section, we develop a simple model that captures what we perceive to be the
essential features of carrier-driver transactions.  Consistent with industry usage, we define a haul
as the transportation of a particular cargo from one specified location to another.  As noted in the
previous section, however, hauls differ in many ways besides origin and destination, including
characteristics such as time of pick-up and delivery, special handling requirements, and
responsibility for other activities such as loading and unloading, tarping, and so on.  The value
and cost of each haul thus depends on its attributes and on their relation to the characteristics of
the carrier and driver.  We define, for any given future haul,
v =  the uncertain value (net revenue) of the haul to the carrier (gross of 
payments to the driver),
and
s  =  the uncertain cost to the driver of carrying the haul,
which we assume to be jointly distributed as F(v,s).
To abstract from risk-sharing considerations, we assume that both drivers and carriers are
risk neutral.  Hence, a transaction between any given driver and carrier is efficient if expected
joint surplus (conditional on observable haul attributes) for a particular haul is nonnegative, i.e.,
E(v-s) > 0.
18  Driver and carrier acceptance of a haul, on the other hand, depends on each party's
expected private surplus and, thus, on how driver services are priced.
The most important assumption of our model is that reaching agreement on fees is, to
some nontrivial degree, costly, reflecting such things as the time and effort required for carriers
to communicate, and for drivers to assess, the attributes of each haul and to settle on a price.
                                                   
18 Understanding v and s as each party's opportunity cost of accepting this transaction and, thus, as what this party
could have earned in its next best alternative, this condition assures that a haul generates at least as much surplus in
this transaction as it could if reallocated to another driver.17
Even though the costs of bargaining over fees for individual hauls may be small in absolute
terms, the large number of hauls that carriers and drivers engage in may nevertheless make those
costs important in the aggregate.  We define nc and nd to be the costs to the carrier and driver,
respectively, of settling on a price for driver services for any given haul, and assume for
simplicity that these costs are the same for all hauls.  Because the model abstracts away from all
other incentive considerations and any risk effects, these costs represent the only source of
deviation from the maximum joint surplus available to a carrier and driver on a haul.  Thus, were
the parties to negotiate prices on a haul-by-haul basis, the potential present discounted value of
surpluses over the (indefinite) life of the carrier-driver relationship would be reduced by a total
of
S(nd+nc)/(1+r)
t  over t Œ[0, •)
=    (nd+nc)/r ,
where r is the one period discount rate.
19  Although, as we previously noted, driver services are
rarely priced this way, such “spot” or contemporaneous pricing of individual hauls represents a
natural default arrangement; carriers and drivers stand to improve their payoffs to the extent they
can agree on pricing arrangements that avoid or reduce these costs.  In what follows, we consider
the potential gains associated with ex ante (or forward) pricing of hauls.  For simplicity, we
consider first the case of carriers and drivers agreeing ex ante to a single uniform payment per
haul for all future hauls.  We then extend the model to consider the type of pricing most often
observed in practice, namely, contingent — either mileage or revenue-based — pricing.
                                                   
19 For simplicity we abstract away from differences in haul durations and assume that each haul takes one period.18
4.1.  Uniform Pricing.
To illustrate the principles at work, consider the choice of a forward fee,  ˆ p, to be paid by
a carrier to a driver for all future hauls regardless of the characteristics of any individual haul.
Agreement on a uniform price to apply to all hauls eliminates the need to set fees on individual
hauls in the future and, thus, leaves a larger aggregate surplus to divide between the carrier and
the driver.
20  Despite agreeing on a fee for future hauls, however, both parties retain the right not
to transact if they perceive the transaction to be a bad deal: The driver may reject a particularly
unattractive haul, or the carrier may withhold a haul that it perceives to be especially valuable to
assign to another, more profitable driver.
21  Of course, rejection or retention of a load does not
necessarily imply either termination of the relationship or reassignment of the haul to another
driver but may instead simply constitute an invitation to renegotiate.
22
Looking at a single haul in isolation, a party will reject a particular transaction whenever
the private gain from renegotiation is greater than the private cost of renegotiation.  If we let p'
represent the price that would result from renegotiation, the driver will reject a haul when
                                                   
20 If the parties must incur one-time ex ante negotiating costs of n = nd + nc to reach agreement on the price to apply
to future hauls, the savings from setting price ex ante relative to negotiating price haul by haul would be (n/r) - n =
n(1-r)/r.  This assumes that the cost of reaching agreement on a fee is the same regardless of whether the fee is
negotiated ex ante or ex post.  If, as might be expected, parties expend more time and effort negotiating a forward
price for multiple future hauls (see, e.g. Goldberg, 1985), savings from negotiating price ex ante remain as long as
the cost of doing so are smaller than n/r.
21 We assume, again for simplicity, that the cost that party i incurs, ni, if a haul is rejected is the same as the cost of
negotiating the price for the haul ex ante and is independent of whether it is the driver that rejects or the carrier that
withholds the haul.  We also abstract here from any differences between owner operators and company drivers in the
extent to which they can reject loads.  In practice, that ability is similar: Although owner operators retain the
contractual right to refuse loads tendered by the carrier (see Lafontaine, 2000), operators that do so are likely to face
retaliation from carriers in the form of poor future load assignments or non-renewal of their contracts.  Conversely,
even though company drivers are nominally not permitted to refuse loads, their ability to quit gives them a de facto
right of rejection.
22 In this respect, nd and nc can be thought of as the minimum of the costs to the parties of renegotiation or of haul
reassignment (compare Oyer, 2001).  In addition to positing renegotiation costs, Oyer’s analyis of managerial
compensation resembles the present analysis in (i) ruling out marginal incentive considerations and (ii) the absence
of significant relationship-specific investments.  His treatment differs, in part, in its assumption of agent risk
aversion and in its emphasis on variation in agents’ outside options vis-à-vis our focus on transaction heterogeneity.19
p' -  ˆ p
 > nd , (1)
and the carrier will retain a haul when
ˆ p - p' > nc . (2)
The areas of performance and rejection implied by this structure are depicted in figure 1.
    Figure 1
Thus, by agreeing on price ex ante, that is, before the attributes of a haul are known to either
party, the parties avoid the need to discover and settle on a mutually acceptable haul-specific
price for a range of potential hauls whose negotiated price would lie between  ˆ p- nc and  ˆ p+ nd.
The savings from ex ante pricing stand to be even larger once the repeat nature of trade is
taken into account.  If we assume the potential for trade indefinitely into the future, the rejection
decisions become
p0' - p ^    0  > nd  + Wd   (1’)
and
p ^    0 - p0' > nc + Wc  ,  (2’)
where a zero subscript denotes current period prices, and Wd and Wc represent driver and carrier
“reputational capital” (Klein, 1992), the discounted stream of expected future profits from
continued cooperation.
23  Inequalities (1’) and (2’) implicitly define what Klein (1992) refers to
as the “self-enforcing range” of a transaction, represented here by the set
                                                   
23The value of continued cooperation will depend on the parties’ defection strategies.  For example, the cost of
defection (foregone gains from not cooperating) will be the increase in expected renegotiation costs in future periods
if the best response to defection by the other party is reversion to the single-period  haul rejection strategy
p'
p ^   
nc nd
carrier retention driver rejection20
f* = {p':  ˆ p - (nc + Wc)  <  p' <   ˆ p+ (nd + Wd)}.
The higher the probability that the would-be renegotiated price, p', falls within f*, the
smaller the number of cases where renegotiation must occur, and thus the greater the proportion
of potential joint surpluses the parties actually realize.  Accordingly, other things the same, the
parties would like to minimize the likelihood that transactions fall outside this range.
In general, the forward price that minimizes this likelihood depends on the costs of
negotiation, nd and nc, and on the distribution of p'.  Defining g Œ [0,1] to be the share of the
surplus accruing to the driver, we can write p' as a function of v and s as p'  = gv + (1-g)s.  This
relation can, in turn, be used to define a distribution G over p' that maps the joint distribution of v
and s, F(v,s), into G(p').
24  The problem for the driver and carrier then is to choose a forward
price,  ˆ p, that minimizes expected negotiation costs over all hauls, or
min ( ) ( ')
ˆ '* p
nn d G p dc p + È
Î Í
˘
˚ ˙ œ Ú f .                        (3)
The first-order condition characterizing the solution to this problem is simply
g( ˆ p- nc – Wc)  =  g( ˆ p+ nd + Wd).                                (4)
In the symmetric case, that is, under symmetric negotiation costs and distribution of p',
this optimal forward price is  ˆ p= E(p'), the expectation of negotiated prices over the set of
potential (surplus-generating) hauls.
25  Figure 2 illustrates the solution for this special case by
superimposing g(p') on figure 1.
                                                                                                                                                                        
(characterized by equations (1) and (2)) and will be the cost of turnover if a party’s best response to the other’s
defection is termination.
24 For convenience, we assume that g  is the same for all hauls and is invariant to the size of the surplus.
25This result illustrates what Williamson (1985: 34) refers to as "equilibrating hazards."21
       Figure 2
In sum, by agreeing ex ante to a fee that leaves both parties with positive expected
surpluses for all hauls over the duration of the carrier-driver relationship — in effect, bundling
hauls of varying characteristics — a carrier and driver can reduce the need to set fees on
individual hauls and leave a larger aggregate surplus to divide between them.
26
4.2.  Contingent Pricing.
Since negotiation costs are incurred in those cases where | p' - ˆ p| is sufficiently large, the
parties could further increase available surpluses by finding a way to tie ˆ ptto pt
'.  Specifically, the
parties can do better if some observable attribute of hauls correlated with p' exists to which they
can relate ˆ p.  Tying price to observable attributes correlated with v and s, however imperfectly,
reduces expected negotiation costs by (i) reducing the gain to reneging (the left-hand side of (1’)
and (2’); and (ii) increasing Wc and Wd and, thus, the penalty for reneging (the right-hand side of
these conditions).  Formally, the parties would like to identify a set of objective haul attributes,
X, and a parameter vector, a, such that  ˆ p= aX minimizes expected
                                                   
26 In this respect, the analysis here is analogous to the “over-search” argument for bundling of diamonds (Barzel,
1982), movies (Kenney and Klein, 1983), and tuna (Gallick, 1996).
p'
nc+Wc




renegotiation costs as per equation (3).
27  Figure 3 illustrates the effect of setting ˆ p = aX for the
symmetric case, assuming s pX ' π 0.  By reducing the variance of (p'- ˆ p) and increasing Wc and
Wd, setting price on observable haul attributes correlated with v and s reduces the likelihood that
hauls lie outside the self-enforcing range (the shaded area) relative to agreeing to a uniform fee
per haul of m = E(p') (represented by the hashed area in figure 3).
Given the value to transactors of agreeing ex ante to a formula for setting prices for future
transactions, the remaining question concerns the choice of X.  Recalling that p' is a function of v
and s (i.e., p'  = gv + (1-g)s), and noting that v and s must themselves be highly correlated in a
competitive market such as trucking, candidates for X consist of a set of haul attributes that
correlate with either carrier’s revenue or driver’s costs.  As discussed in section 3, this set
includes such factors as distance, route, weight, and the time it takes to complete a haul.  In the
abstract, the best of this set would be the haul attribute (or attributes) most highly correlated with
                                                   














v and s.  In practice, however, candidates for X must also be objective and difficult for the parties
to manipulate.
28  Thus, although time spent on the job is one of the most important determinants
of driver costs (see table 2), over-the-road truck drivers are rarely paid on an hourly basis
because of the difficulty of distinguishing hours legitimately incurred working from hours taken
as leisure or resulting from poor judgment in route choice or from simple misreporting.
Similarly, miles traveled correlates with such things as fuel costs and equipment wear and tear as
well as work time but, again, is subject to driver manipulation; compensating drivers on the basis
of actual miles traveled reduces driver incentives to take the most direct and economical route.
29
As in other price determination settings, the choice of formula for setting driver compensation
involves a tradeoff between the "accuracy" of the formula (the correlation between  ˆ pand p'), on
the one hand, and the ability of the parties to verify and manipulate the chosen measure(s), on the
other.
30
In this light, the use of "bureau" miles, rather than actual miles traveled, in mileage-based
pay schemes has the advantage that, while correlated with actual miles and, thus, with driver's
cost, bureau miles are outside the driver's (and carrier's) control.  As our earlier discussion
indicated, however, that correlation is imperfect inasmuch as drivers’ costs vary with traffic,
customer cooperation, loading time, and so forth.  The greater the variation in drivers’ costs
relative to bureau miles, the less successful mileage-based pay will be in keeping freight
transactions within the self-enforcing range.  Basing driver pay on carrier revenue, by contrast, is
                                                   
28 Cf. Milgrom and Roberts (1991: 215): "To base a compensation formula on something that is not objectively
measurable is to invite disputes and unhappiness among employees."
29 A driver scheduled to complete a delivery late enough in the day to preclude picking up another load might, for
instance, choose to take a "scenic route" to the destination to run up compensation.
30 Note that in pick-up-and-delivery carriage, where drivers cover relatively fixed and/or local routes, drivers have
less discretion and therefore driver opportunism in reporting hours is less of a problem.  Accordingly, drivers
involved in this type of carriage, unlike long-haul truckers, are more often paid on an hourly basis.24
less likely to result in driver (and carrier) dissatisfaction with price since the freight bill
negotiated between a shipper and a carrier can reflect non-mileage determinants of cost as well
as distance.  Carrier revenue, however, is vulnerable to manipulation by carriers who, despite
federal regulations requiring carriers to make their freight bills available to drivers paid as a
percent of revenue (49 Code of Federal Regulations 376.12), have been known to underreport,
divert, or otherwise conceal the true freight bill in order to lower a driver's compensation.  The
difficulty of verifying carrier revenue is widely viewed as a deterrent to the more extensive use
of revenue-based compensation.
31
Based on these considerations, we expect the choice between mileage- and revenue-based
driver compensation to reflect the heterogeneity of haul attributes.  Mileage-based compensation
is likely to be chosen for hauls where the variation in haul attributes (around a linear function of
bureau miles) is relatively small while the use of revenue-based fees will be reserved for
transactions for which the distribution of haul attributes around mileage is diffuse.  We explore
this relationship empirically below.  We do this first by showing that there are significant
differences in haul characteristics between main categories of long-haul trucking, namely dry
van, flatbed, refrigerated, and tankers, and then showing that the incidence of the two main pay
bases varies significantly across these categories as well.
5. The Data
The data for this study come from a survey of drivers conducted under the University of
Michigan Trucking Industry Program (UMTIP).  The survey, designed to elicit detailed
                                                   
31 Statements like the following are indicative of driver suspicions: “There is a mistrust of how carriers represent
their rates to owner-operators, says Glen Rice, a consultant and former driver adviser for Landstar Inway.  ‘Are they
lying?  They could be,’ he says. ‘Are they taking a little off the top?  Not showing all the charges?’” (Heine, 1999).
For an example of litigation alleging carrier misreporting of revenue, see Strickland et al. vs. Truckers Express, Inc.,
No. CV95-62M-RFC (filed US District Court, Montana).25
information on truck drivers and their jobs, was conducted in two waves, the first during the
summer of 1997 and the second in August and September of 1998.  The survey was carried out
under a two-stage randomized design: In the first stage, truck stops were randomly selected as
interview sites to be representative of the volume of truck traffic across the Midwest.  In the
second stage, respondents were chosen at random at the selected sites.  This sampling procedure
was meant specifically to target over-the-road truck drivers, who are much more likely than local
drivers to use the services offered at truck stops.  In the end, 1019 truck drivers — 748 of whom
were over-the-road drivers operating in for-hire trucking — at 22 different truck stops took
approximately 45 minutes each to answer over 220 questions on topics such as compensation,
driving and non-driving work hours and hours of rest, work duties, work history, and
demographic characteristics.
32  Among the set of questions asked was a series of specific
inquiries about the characteristics of the last load carried by drivers.  We rely on this part of the
survey extensively in our analyses.
6.  Data Analyses and Results
6.1  The Variance in Haul Characteristics.
The main prediction of the theory is that driver compensation is more likely to be set as a
percentage of the freight bill (revenue) rather than mileage the greater the variation in haul
attributes, especially attributes not highly correlated with official bureau miles.  Conceptually,
the relevant measure of haul variation for this purpose is the variance (or heterogeneity) of the
population of hauls from which a particular carrier draws in selecting and assigning hauls to a
particular driver.  Our data, however, contain information only on the attributes of each driver's
most recent haul.  As an approximation to heterogeneity in the pool of potential hauls for each
                                                   
32 See Belman et al. (1998) for a summary report on the first wave of interviews.26
driver-carrier pair, we look at differences in the heterogeneity of haul characteristics for
identifiable sub-populations of haul types on the assumption that serial haul assignments are
more likely occur within than between sub-populations.  Based on interviews with industry
experts and our examination of trade publications, we expect greater variation in the attributes of
hauls carried by flatbed and, to a lesser extent, refrigerator and tanker trailers, than in standard
dry vans.  Flatbed loads, for instance, often are “over-dimensional and short-haul, tend to be high
value, and sometimes require slower speeds, alternate routes and even escorts” (Heine, 1999).
Dry van hauls, in contrast, are often described as “plain vanilla” hauls.
Our earlier discussion identified several haul attributes that drivers consider unattractive
(see table 2).  Our data allows us to measure several of those attributes, identified and defined in
table 3.
33   The first four variables describe the amount of time spent by a driver either waiting for
or performing non-driving activities, including loading and unloading.  Since drivers are not
compensated for this time under mileage-based pay, drivers find hauls with large values of these
variables unattractive.
34  The next four variables measure time waiting and time spent performing
non-driving activities as a proportion of mileage, driving time per mile (the inverse of average
speed) and, finally, total trip time divided by miles driven, which captures the overall
"productivity" of the haul:  For drivers compensated on the basis of mileage, the longer it takes
overall to complete a haul of a given distance, the lower is the driver’s (implicit) compensation
per hour (holding rate per mile constant).  The last variable is time away from home, an attribute
                                                   
33 The survey only contains data on “driver unfriendly” haul attributes (the right-hand tail of figure 2) and not
information on haul characteristics or their values that would be likely to cause carriers to want to retain loads (the
left-hand tail).  Our empirical analysis accordingly focuses on the upper tail of the distribution.
34 In addition to the main compensation factors, drivers sometimes receive performance bonuses (for mileage, safety,
etc.) and are sometimes paid for specific tasks (loading/unloading, extra stops, New-York trip).  Consistent with the
argument that mileage is a less accurate proxy for costs than revenue, Lafontaine (2000) documents that bonuses and
extra pay are used more in combination with mileage-based compensation.  To the extent that the use of such
additional payments substitutes for the greater accuracy of revenue-based compensation, the likelihood that we will
find systematic differences in the use of these two pay forms in our data is reduced.27
identified by the Truckload Carriers Association as the second most cited reason (behind
excessive waiting time) for driver turnover (Wall Street Journal, 2001).
Table 3. Haul Characteristics
Characteristic
Wait: load/unload Minutes waiting for loading and unloading
Wait: total Minutes waiting for loading and unloading + minutes waiting for other reasons*
Time: load/unload Minutes spent loading and unloading
Time not driving: total Minutes loading and unloading + minutes spent on other non-driving work**
Waiting per mile Wait: total / miles driven
Time not driving per mile Time not driving: total / miles driven
Time driving per mile Time driving / miles driven
Total time per mile Total time / miles driven
Last home Number of days since home for 24 hours
*Includes time waiting for dispatch, truck breakdown or maintenance, fueling, traffic, parking/loading space, inspections,
and cargo problems.
**Includes time spent on drop and hook up, truck maintenance, fueling, paperwork, tarping/chaining, and residential
delivery.
Our interest is in the upper tail of the distribution of undesirable haul attributes (as
illustrated in figure 3) for different trailer types, and our expectation is that the frequency of
undesirable attributes will be higher (the upper tail of the distribution thicker) for non-dry van
hauls than for dry van hauls.  To assess this supposition, we first test for differences in the
distributions of these variables across trailer types using Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests.
35  The null
hypothesis is that the distribution of these characteristics are the same or, more specifically, that
fi(x) = fv(x), where fv(x) represents the density of characteristic x for dry vans and fi(x), i =  f, r, t,
represents the corresponding density for flatbed, refrigerated, and tanker trucks, respectively.
Results of these tests are reported in table 4.  For each haul characteristic, the first D value (first
row) represents the largest positive difference and the second D value (second row) the largest
                                                   
35 The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is a non-parametric test of the equality of two distributions.  See
http://www.physics.csbsju.edu/stats/KS-test.html.28
negative difference between the distributions for dry vans and each of the “specialized” haul
categories, while the corresponding p-values indicate the significance level of each difference.
TABLE 4.  KOLMOGOROV-SMIRNOV EQUALITY OF DISTRIBUTION TESTS
(comparisons to dry vans)
flatbed refrigerated tanker
D p-value D p-value D p-value
0.02 0.89 0.00 1.00 0.04 0.93 Wait:
load/unload -0.15 0.02 -0.21 0.00 -0.13 0.41
0.01 0.99 0.00 1.00 0.07 0.78 Wait: total
-0.15 0.03 -0.27 0.00 -0.09 0.70
0.02 0.92 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.97 Time:
load/unload -0.32 0.00 -0.11 0.11 -0.30 0.01
0.014 0.97 0.05 0.62 0.03 0.94 Time not
driving: total -0.23 0.00 -0.09 0.25 -0.17 0.22
0.00 1.00 0.01 0.98 0.09 0.72 Wait per mile
-0.16 0.03 -0.14 0.07 -0.14 0.44
0.00 1.00 0.14 0.05 0.08 0.74 Time not
driving per mile -0.29 0.00 -0.02 0.92 -0.21 0.13
0.03 0.86 0.10 0.22 0.02 0.98 Time driving
per mile -0.09 0.27 -0.02 0.91 -0.26 0.05
0.00 1.00 0.03 0.90 0.95 0.92 Total time
per mile -0.19 0.01 -0.06 0.58 -0.24 0.13
0.07 0.50 0.01 0.98 0.13 0.50 Last home
-0.04 0.74 -0.14 0.06 -0.02 0.99
Values significant at the .10 level in bold
The results in the first column of table 4 support our contention that the variance in haul
attributes is greater for flatbed than for dry van hauls.  For six of our eight variables, there is a
significant difference in the distributions (at the .10 level or better, indicated as bold type in the
table), and in all of these cases the results imply that the distribution from which dry van
attributes were drawn contains smaller values (D is negative) than does the distribution for
flatbed trucks.  The results for refrigerated and tanker hauls are less striking but still broadly
confirm our expectations.  Of the five comparisons between refrigerated and dry van haul29
attributes for which the null hypothesis of equal distributions is rejected, four are significantly
negative (the exception being time spent on non-driving work per mile), indicating that the
corresponding distributions tend to contain smaller values for dry vans than for refrigerated
trailers.  The fewness of tanker observations (only 21 to 29, depending on the variable, compared
to 271-376 observations for dry vans, 81-124 for flatbeds, and 87-117 for refrigerated trailers
(see table 5)) reduces the power of the test for differences in the attribute distributions for tankers
versus dry vans.  Still, the data reject the null hypothesis of equivalent distributions for two of
the variables and, in both cases, attributes for tankers are estimated to be drawn from a
distribution with higher values than the distribution of those attributes for dry vans.  Overall, the
evidence is broadly consistent with the proposition that attributes of flatbed hauls and, to a lesser
extent, those of refrigerated and tanker hauls, are distributed differently from the attributes of dry
van hauls, and specifically that non dry-van hauls tend to exhibit higher levels of undesirable
attributes.
Table 5 provides additional information on the distribution of haul attributes across trailer
types in the form of descriptive statistics.  In addition to mean, median, and number of
observations, the table includes four measures of dispersion.  The first of these, in column 4, is
the standard deviation.  The remaining three columns contain alternative measures of the
thickness of the upper tail of the distribution of each attribute: the proportion of observations
with positive values; the proportion of the hauls with attribute values more than a standard
deviation away from the mean (where both the standard deviation and the mean are calculated
across all hauls and trailer types); and the value of the 90
th percentile.  Although there areTABLE 5.  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR HAUL ATTRIBUTES
obs. mean median s.d. %>0 %>m+s 90
th percentile
Wait: load/unload
      Van 376 101.9 30 209.4 64 7.3 240
      Flatbed 119 138.8 60 325.2 74 6.7 300
      Refrigerated 116 205.3 97.5 205.3 82 18.9 450
      Tanker 29 105.3 60 137.6 66 10.3 390
Wait: total
      Van 334 229.0 60 462.4 77 6.3 555
      Flatbed 106 355.4 120 619.0 81 12.3 1410
      Refrigerated 97 477.0 180 1,120 92 11.3 1050
      Tanker 26 167.1 60 256.6 81 3.9 390
Time: load/unload
      Van 376 39.5 0 125.5 26 5.4 120
      Flatbed 121 52.4 30 73.7 48 5.0 150
      Refrigerated 117 89.9 0 281.8 36 8.5 180
      Tanker 29 53.6 5 79.7 55 6.9 210
Time: total
      Van 346 70.1 30 138.6 79 5.0 180
      Flatbed 111 90.9 60 105.7 82 7.2 240
      Refrigerated 108 126.7 30 310.3 74 11.1 300
      Tanker 28 75.4 52 86.7 79 7.1 225
Wait per mile driven
      Van 290 0.45 0.12 1.01 na 4.1 1.16
      Flatbed 89 0.85 0.24 2.28 na 7.1 1.76
      Refrigerated 90 0.58 0.21 1.61 na 3.3 1.24
      Tanker 23 0.36 0.12 0.54 na 4.3 0.79
Time not driving per mile
      Van 300 0.13 0.05 0.09 na 6.9 0.35
      Flatbed 92 0.20 0.12 0.300 na 9.8 0.41
      Refrigerated 101 0.12 0.04 0.263 na 5.9 0.30
      Tanker 25 0.20 0.10 0.310 na 12 0.57
Time driving per mile
      Van 317 1.21 1.11 0.53 na 8.3 1.60
      Flatbed 102 1.23 1.14 0.46 na 9.8 1.65
      Refrigerated 106 1.23 1.12 0.54 na 9.4 1.64
      Tanker 26 1.29 1.17 0.64 na 7.7 1.62
Total time per mile
      Van 271 1.76 1.38 1.25 na 3.7 2.91
      Flatbed 84 2.31 1.62 2.73 na 9.5 3.43
      Refrigerated 87 1.94 1.44 1.81 na 8.0 3.18
      Tanker 22 1.89 1.54 1.11 na 13.6 4.01
Last home for 24 hrs.
      Van 304 9.41 4 19.54 na  5.9 21
      Flatbed 100 9.42 4 20.56 na 4.0 14.5
      Refrigerated 97 13.30 6 18.25 na 12.4 30
      Tanker 21 6 4 7.66 na 4.8 1431
exceptions (particularly for the tanker category, which contains relatively few observations),
these statistics generally indicate that the distributions of the attributes of non-dry van hauls
exhibit greater variability and, despite their smaller numbers in our data, higher extreme values
than do the corresponding distributions of dry van attributes.
6.2.  The Determinants of Driver Compensation and Truck Ownership.
To the extent that flatbed, refrigerated, and tanker hauls are in fact more heterogeneous than
dry van hauls, the theory predicts that driver compensation will be based on revenue more often
for these non-dry van trailer types than for dry vans.  Table 6 shows the breakdown of
compensation forms by trailer type in our data.  Consistent with the theory, driver compensation
is far more likely to be tied to carrier revenue for flatbed, refrigerated, and tanker hauls than for
dry vans: While about 16 percent of drivers of dry vans report being paid as a percentage of
revenue, a third of drivers of refrigerated vans and approximately half of flatbed and tanker
drivers are paid on a percentage basis.









Dry van 307 58 0.16
Flatbed 54 61 0.53
Refrigerated 74 39 0.33
Tanker 15 14 0.48
Source: UMTIP Driver Survey Data
Although these data patterns are consistent with the theory, it is possible that factors other
than haul heterogeneity, yet correlated with trailer type, explain the differential use of percentage
pay across these categories of hauls.  Among such possible influences, we know from table 1 that32
the incidence of revenue-based compensation differs between company drivers and owner-
operators.  This is also true in our data; whereas only about a fifth of company drivers (93 out of
457) are paid as a percentage of revenue, nearly half (79 out of 165) of owner-operators receive
revenue-based compensation.  To the extent that truck ownership varies among trailer types, and
compensation form is related to truck ownership, the correlation between compensation forms
and trailer types reported in table 6 might simply be the result of differences across trailer types
in the propensity for drivers to own their own trucks.
To investigate this possibility, we use a bivariate Probit regression model to estimate the
determinants of compensation form and truck ownership.  We do this first as a function only of
trailer types and then with a set of additional potential determinants of organizational form.
Consistent with the previous table, the first column of table 7 shows significantly greater use of
revenue-based compensation for non-dry van than for dry van hauls.  No significant difference,
however, exists in the likelihood of drivers working as employees (as opposed to independent
owner-operators) among trailer types, as indicated by the estimates in column 2.  Of note, the
value of r and its c
2 statistic indicate a significant correlation in the disturbances in the
compensation-form and truck-ownership equations, indicating that compensation form and truck
ownership are affected by a common set of unobserved variables.  Our results show that the
observed correlation between revenue-based pay and driver ownership of trucks (see table 1) is
not the result of differences in attributes associated with trailer type, however.
The third and fourth columns of table 7 report results obtained after adding to the
estimation a set of driver characteristics to control for the possibility that truck ownership and
compensation form reflect driver preferences (for, say, risk or independence) or wealth
constraints.  These additional variables are driver’s experience (years driving trucks), marital33
status, and non-driving family income.
36  The results with respect to trailer type are unaffected by
the inclusion of these variables; trailer type continues to have a significant relation to
compensation but remains unrelated to the truck ownership decision.
TABLE 7. BIVARIATE PROBIT OWNERSHIP AND PAY FORM ESTIMATES
% revenue company driver % revenue company driver
     Constant -1.008* 0.638* -1.062*  1.278*
(-12.70) (8.99) (-8.19) (9.50)
     Flatbed 1.08* -0.185 1.065* -0.241
(7.69) (-1.32) (7.33) (-1.63)
     Refrigerated 0.612* 0.943 0.593* 0.019
(4.23) (0.64) (3.92) (0.12)
     Tanker 0.970* 0.190 0.947* 0.187
(3.913) (0.70) (3.80) (0.67)
     Experience 0.008 -0.027*
(1.37) (-4.80)
     Married -0.091 -0.221**
(-0.72) (-1.72)
     Other income 0.001 -0.006*
(0.38) (-2.03)




log likelihood: -666.72 -601.18
c




*: significant at the .05 level.
**: significant at the .10 level.
As for the driver-specific variables themselves, the results show no relation between
compensation form and any of the driver characteristics.  Driver experience, non-driving income
and (at the .10 level) marital status are, however, all significantly correlated with drivers owning
                                                   
36 In unreported estimations, we also included driver's age, educational level, and number of children.  Coefficients
on education and number of children were never significant; driver age had a significant effect only if driver
experience (which is highly correlated with age) is excluded.   We use non-driving income, rather than total income,
because of the (greater) potential endogeneity of driver income from trucking.34
their vehicles and, thus, their status as owner operators.   Truck ownership, it appears, has more
to do with the characteristics of drivers than of vehicles.
6.3.  Interpretation.
The finding that driver compensation is more likely to be based on carrier revenue for
non-dry van hauls than for dry van hauls, combined with the evidence that the former tend to
exhibit higher levels and greater variance of "driver-unfriendly" haul characteristics, is consistent
with the price-determination theory advanced in this paper; freight transactors are willing to
sacrifice the greater objectivity of mileage-based compensation for the greater accuracy of
revenue-based compensation where noncontractible haul attributes vary widely.  The results are
also consistent with our contention that asset specificity is not a major determinant of governance
arrangements in freight hauling; the lack of correlation between trailer types and truck ownership
indicates no significant difference in the difficulty of arranging alternative transportation for
hauls carried by specialized versus non-specialized vehicles.
37  Our theory, developed to explain
driver compensation arrangements in trucking, does not, however, address the issue of vehicle
ownership and therefore does not explain the correlation between truck ownership and driver
characteristics observed in our data.
One possible interpretation of the vehicle ownership results suggested by the negative
correlation between drivers’ non-driving income and company-driver status is that truck
ownership (hence, employment status) reflects differences in driver risk aversion; to the extent
that drivers who are less dependent on income from trucking are less averse to the risk associated
                                                   
37 The only case in which a coefficient on vehicle type is even nearly significant (less than .90 confidence) as a
determinant of driver status is the coefficient for flatbed in the specification including driver characteristics (column
4), and that coefficient is negative, implying that drivers that pull flatbed trailers are more likely to be own their
trucks, the opposite of the relationship typically hypothesized.35
with truck ownership, drivers with more income from other sources should be more inclined to
own and operate their own vehicles.  The fact, however, that young, unmarried drivers —
presumably the greater risk takers — are more likely, other things the same, to drive employer-
owned vehicles seems contrary to a risk-sharing motivation.
38
An alternative explanation that aligns better with the data is that wealth constraints
present a significant impediment to truck ownership: More experienced, married drivers with
other sources of income are more likely to have the capital, or be able to obtain the financing,
necessary to own their own trucks.  In this respect, our findings accord with the sizable literature
on self-employment, in which wealth and human capital are important determinants of the
decision to be self-employed (Dunn and Holtz-Eakin, 2000; Evans and Leighton, 1989; and
Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen, 1994; among others).
39
7. Conclusion
The role of relationship-specific investments in the choice and design of organizational
arrangements is by now well established.  A careful survey of the organizational terrain,
however, reveals a variety of organizational practices that do not readily fit the conventional
model.  The use of long-term contracts or vertical integration in settings, like equipment leasing
and franchising, where relationship-specific investments are small or absent is one such
anomaly; the phenomenon of contracting parties going to the trouble of specifying complex,
detailed price and performance obligations yet leaving one or both parties broad discretion to
                                                   
38 The fact that ownership is not related to vehicle type, despite the differential variance in driver costs among
vehicle types, also runs contrary to the risk-sharing hypothesis.  At the same time, the absence of correlation
between driver characteristics and compensation form suggests that drivers’ wealth or their preferences for risk or
independence are not important determinants of compensation arrangements.
39 Supporting this interpretation of the results is the prevalence of carrier-operated lease purchase and rent-to-own
programs in the industry, which are promoted as a form of driver recruitment (see The National Survey of Driver
Wages, 2001, p. 6).36
terminate the agreement — equipment leases and franchise contracts again being examples — is
another.  The coincidence of highly redeployable assets and detailed, long-term but easily
terminable contracts found in equipment leasing and franchising is also a feature of the freight
transactions we examined in this paper.  Although vehicles and the skills needed to operate them
are rarely specific to any particular carrier or shipper, owner-operators typically operate under
so-called “permanent leases” that constrain the trucker to carry exclusively a specific carrier’s
hauls for an extended period but that also allow either party to terminate the agreement, typically
with thirty or fewer days notice.  In other cases, carriers integrate the provision of freight
services, owning their own trucks and hiring drivers as employees — again in a setting with no
major, discernable specific investments.  To explain these practices, we clearly need to look
elsewhere.
Agency theory, which has dominated analyses of, among other areas, franchise
contracting and incentive compensation, is one alternative.  But puzzles remain.  Basic
implications of the standard agency model have been challenged by empirical findings showing a
positive relationship between the use of sharing rules and "risk" (see Lafontaine and
Bhattacharyya, 1995; Lafontaine and Slade, 2001; and Prendergast, forthcoming) and by the
widespread use of “incentive pay” schemes that have no plausible incentive effects (Oyer, 2001).
In a similar way, marginal incentive considerations, which likely explain why drivers’ fees per
haul are (almost always) fixed ex ante (making drivers residual claimants on each haul), cannot
explain differences in the bases used to determine those fees since the incentive implications of
the fees are identical regardless of the basis on which they are determined.
In this paper, we explore a third explanation for the contracting practices observed in
road transport.  Specifically, we have argued that contracts between carriers and drivers in the37
trucking industry serve primarily to economize on the costs of price determination in
heterogeneous transactions.  Applying this argument, we predict that mileage pay, which has low
implementation costs but is also a relatively low accuracy predictor of driver costs, will be used
to compensate drivers when the variance in non-mileage related haul attributes is relatively low,
and conversely, carriers and drivers will tend to adopt percentage pay — the higher cost but also
higher accuracy predictor of driver costs — in situations where haul characteristics vary more
widely across hauls.  Consistent with these predictions, we find that mileage pay is in fact used
much more frequently in the dry-van segment of the industry, where loads are more similar, and
less frequently for hauls carried by specialized trailers, especially flatbed trailers, where hauls
tend to vary more along dimensions not related to mileage.
Consistent with our claim that asset specificity is not a major determinant of governance
form in trucking, we also found that truck ownership is not related to vehicle types in our data
but, rather, depends on individual driver characteristics such as experience and access to other
income.  In this respect, the factors that lead drivers to own their own trucks, and hence, to
become independent owner operators, appear to be similar to the human and financial capital
variables that have been shown to explain the self-employment decision and to wealth
constraints that lead to the separation of ownership and control of corporate assets despite the
incentive advantages of combining the two.
In addition to increasing our understanding of contracting practices in the trucking
industry, the broader goal of this paper has been to highlight motives for contract terms that have
received less attention in the literature to date.  Among other applications, we believe that the
factors emphasized in this paper provide a potential resolution of the previously noted puzzle
concerning the positive relation between risk and sharing rules in the empirical literature.  The38
desire to “equilibrate hazards” in this framework may also explain the concern for “fairness” and
“equity” often expressed by contracting parties (see Masten, 1988; Lafontaine, 1992).
40  Our
hope is that others also will consider such alternatives when confronted with observed
organizational arrangements or empirical results that do not fit the traditional models.
                                                   
40Out of 130 respondents in Lafontaine's (1992) survey of franchisors, 23 said they used royalties based on sales
rather than a fixed price because “Fixed fees would be unfair for fluctuating sales, for low volume and/or new
outlets,” 32 responded that “Both parties share in the success or failure of the outlet,” and 24 indicated they felt like
the resulting fees were “Based on performance and ability to pay” (italics added).39
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Data Appendix
Sample Description and Exclusions
As noted in the text, the UMTIP Survey of Truck Drivers covered a total of 1019 drivers.
Of these, 748 classified themselves as full-time, for-hire, over-the-road company drivers or
owner operators.  This group subdivided by trailer type, based on their current haul, into: dry
vans, 402; flatbeds, 128; refrigerated, 124; and tanker, 31.  The remaining 63 observations either
fell into trailer categories with few observations (dropdeck, 19; autocar, 5; containers, 3; bobtail,
3; and other, 26) or contained missing or invalid values.   The 685 company drivers and owner
operators in the four largest haul segments form the basis for the analysis of haul characteristics
in tables 4 and 5.  Missing or invalid values account for further reductions in sample size for
specific characteristics.
For purposes of analyzing compensation arrangements and driver status (truck
ownership), the sample of valid observations was further reduced from 685 to 622 by the
following exclusions: Drivers paid some other way, 30 observations; drivers reporting both
mileage- and revenue-based pay, 24 observations; drivers reporting both owner operator and
company driver status, 4 observations; and, finally, 5 observations for missing or invalid values
of other variables.  Missing driver characteristics (mostly for the variable “Other income”)
resulted in the 579 observation total in the second specification in table 7.